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A. Introduction
In Idaho Independent Bank's ("IIB" or the "Bank") Brief, the Bank raises
an additional issue on appeal. Respondents Brief, p. 10. That issue was not in
contention before the district court at the Motion for Reconsideration as the district
court did not grant summary judgment pursuant to those arguments. R 947-54 (the
district court's ruling on IIB's motion for summary judgment). As such, the
Frantzes have not yet addressed IIB's newly raised arguments. Resultantly, there
are supplemental facts important in addressing the Bank's new issues.
B. Supplemental Facts

The Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes project (the "Project"), not to be confused
with the corporation Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes, Inc. ("Eagle Ridge"), was
acquired/owned and funded at least as follows:
1. Purpose: Acquisition of I 04 acres
Date: September 22, 2005
Borrower: Twin Lakes Eagle View Estates, LLC 1
Guarantor: The Frantzes
Lender: Idaho Independent Bank
Loan Amount: $837,750.00

1A

limited liability company wholly owned and/or controlled by the Frantzes.
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("SR.

1

note

by Twin Lakes Eagle View Estates, LLC for the Project, which documents the
above information).
2. Purpose: Construction Funding
Date: April 19, 2006
Borrower: Twin Lakes Eagle View Estate, LLC
Guarantor: The Frantzes
Lender: IIB
Loan Amount: $3,000,000.00

See SR 9-19 (mortgage in favor ofIIB documenting the above information).
3. Purpose: Acquisition of 50 additional acres.
Date: November 30, 2006
Borrower: Twin Lakes Property, LLC 3
Guarantor: The Frantzes
Lender: IIB
Loan Amount: $828,700.00

See SR 20 (satisfaction of mortgage in favor of Twin Lakes Property, LLC
document the above information).
4. Purpose: Construction Funding
Date: December 14, 2006
Borrower: Eagle Ridge4, the company (not to be confused with the
Project)
Guarantor: The Frantzes
2

A motion to augment the record will be submitted promptly.
An entity wholly owned and/or controlled by the Frantzes.
4 Yet another entity wholly owned and/or controlled by the Frantzes.
3
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Lender:
Loan Amount: $3,750,000.00

See R 305-06 (Promissory note which reflects the above information).
5. Pm pu:s.:; Cuu:sti udiuu F uudiug Iu~n;a:st::

Date: July 11, 2007
Borrower: Eagle Ridge
Guarantor: The Frantzes
Lender: IIB
Loan Amount: $4,5000,000.00

See R 307-08 (Promissory note documenting the above information).
6. Purpose: Construction Funding Extension
Date: April 17, 2008
Borrower: Eagle Ridge
Guarantor: The Frantzes
Lender: IIB
Loan Amount: $4,5000,000.00

See R 309 (Change in Terms Agreement documenting the above information).
7. Purpose: Construction Funding Extension
Date: January 21, 2009
Debtor: Eagle Ridge
Borrower: The Frantzes
Lender: IIB
Loan Amount: $4,5000,000.00

See R.312-13 (Promissory Note documenting the above information).
During all five years of lending activity with the Project, only two things
remain constant: the Guarantor (the Frantzes), and the Lender (IIB). There were
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numerous

place

controlled by the Frantzes. Eagle Ridge was merely one of many entities to whom
IIB actually lent money. Further, all notes, mortgages, and guarantees were
virtually identical (with the exceptions being: the borrower, the amount, and the
maturity date). All other terms (including the interest rate 5) were fixed between the
parties.
In 2008, the Frantzes were able to generate more than $3,100,000.00 from a
sale/leaseback of one of their assets. R 485 (An IIB loan memorandum discussing
that Mr. Frantz generated "$3.4MM."). At that point, the Frantzes discussed with
the Bank what to do with the funds: pay down the Eagle Ridge loan, or invest the
money into the Project. R 411. The one issue, however, was the fact that if the
Frantzes invested their money into the Project, they knew they would not have
enough capital to fund the Project's infrastructure to completion. The Frantzes
knew they would not have enough money. R 411, 124 - R 412, 128. So, they
went and discussed the matter with the Bank and told the Bank as much. Id. In
response, IIB made the oral promise/agreement in contention in this case.
5

The interest rate did change, but it was based off of Prime. R 486. As such,
while the actual interest percentage number changed, the formula used to derive
that number remained constant.
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it
continue to lend money. Id. Instead, IIB promised the Frantzes that it would
continue to lend money under the same parameters as it had been doing for the last
several years so long as the Frantzes were creditworthy and the appraisal of the
collateral (the Project) justified the loan. Id. The bank was not stepping out on a
limb to make that promise. After all, that is what a bank does: it makes loans to
people who are creditworthy with collateral that justifies the loan. That is all IIB
promised to do: make a loan if there was sufficient collateral and a creditworthy
guarantor.
There is no reason why a bank would not make such a promise. If a party is
creditworthy and the collateral is sufficient, there would be no reason to deny such
a loan; particularly for a client with whom a bank has an extensive relationship and
who bears more than $2,300,000.00 on deposit with the bank. R 486 (IIB detailing
the substantial deposits the Frantzes had with the Bank). The Frantzes' affirmative
defenses are not based on some fanciful claim that the Bank went beyond its
normal practices and promised to make a vague future loan. Indeed, IIB merely
promised to do what it does: it promised to continue issuing loans if the guarantor
was creditworthy and the collateral justified it.
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2009,

an appraisal

'"Upon Completion6" value at $15,790,000.00. R 256-61 (a copy of a portion of
the appraisal IIB ordered in late 2009 determining the collateral's value). As such,
the collateral justified the loan. Additionally, IIB, in 2010 underwrote the Frantzes
and found them creditworthy. In fact, IIB approved the Frantzes in underwriting
and offered them and Eagle Ridge a three year extension on the $4,500,000.00
outstanding loan. See 21-128 (the unsigned documents which IIB had prepared for
the three year extension7). The Frantzes never executed these documents because
they did not provide the additional funding necessary to complete the Project,
which funding IIB had promised.
That three year loan extension was neither an oral offer nor a preliminary
commitment. The Bank had spent time, money, and effort fully underwriting the
Frantzes and preparing every document necessary for IIB to collateralize the
Project. Id. All documents were ready to go and had been delivered to the
Frantzes for signature.

6

Also known as, "As Completed" value.
The loan date was "4-19-2010" and the maturity date was "04-15-2013," three
years.
7
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the Frantzes

more

than $15,000,000.00 in collateral, IIB refused to honor its promise/agreement; IIB
refused to do what it, as a bank, does. Ultimately, IIB refused to provide the
needed funding for the completion of the Project. Of course, after having spent all
their money on the Project, the Frantzes were without sufficient resources to
complete the Project. Being unable to complete the Project, the Frantzes had no
source of income large enough and liquid enough to pay off the nearly
$4,500,000.00 loan.
IIB made promises to the Frantzes. Those promises were not "too good to
be true." They were promises that the Bank would do what it is supposed to do:
lend money to creditworthy customers who have sufficient collateral. After the
Frantzes poured their time, energy and money into the Project and were left with
little but their reliance on IIB 's promise, IIB pulled the rug out from underneath
them. That unconscionable conduct cannot be allowed to stand. More
importantly, IIB's documents (i.e. the guarantees) do not bar the Frantzes from
asserting their affirmative defenses because, while they wave almost everything
under the sun, they do not waive their affirmative defenses based on estoppel.

Appellant's Reply Brief- Pg. 7

The Terms of IIB's Promise/Agreement

the Frantzes

While IIB contends otherwise, the terms ofIIB's promise/agreement were
definite and readily ascertainable:

1) Amount: The amount reasonably necessary for the Project to be completed,
but at no time will this amount exceed 60% of the most recent "as
completed" evaluation performed by a licensed real estate appraiser. R 137.
Loan memorandums prepared by IIB demonstrate that this method was used
by the Bank in determining the reasonableness of the amount of the loan.
See R. 486 8 (discussing the loan to value ratio); see also S.R. 143. This
number/amount was always easily and simply determined by looking at the
most recent appraisal's "as completed" value and multiplying it by 0.6.

2) Interest Rate: The interest rate was to be the Prime rate +2%. IIB's
previous loan interest rates followed the Commercial Loan Pricing
Guideline, which specified that, "a spread to our best customer on land
development loans should be 2% over Prime with a floor of 8.25%". R. 486
(under the section "Structure:" section the loan memorandum discusses the
basis for the interest rate). IIB had a formula for determining the interest
8See

SR 129-31 for a more readable version.
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was

capable

That rate was Prime plus 2%. Id.; see also S.R. 132. That method was to be
continued and followed. While historically, all ofIIB's loans funding the
Project's development contained varying interest rates, that is only because
Prime (which is subject to a ready determination) moved and changed over
the years.

3) The Disbursement Schedule: Like the others terms, the disbursement
schedule was to be as it had always been. IIB would disburse the funds
upon request and proof of expenditure. That's how it had always been done
before. See S.R. 133-42 (two examples of draw requests for the construction
funding). That's how it was supposed to continue being disbursed.

4) The Security of the Loan: This, too, was definite. The continuing security
for the loan was to be the same 104 acres that IIB had held as security for
years plus the newly acquired 50 acres. R 483.

5) Parties' rights after Default: The parties had always used the exact same
language for each loan (note and mortgage). See R. 19-54 (the identical
notes/mortgages/personal guarantees executed over the years). The Frantzes
always signed the exact same personal guaranty. Id. All rights after default
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note/mortgage/personal guaranty

never

were

change or be altered. They would remain the same as they had always been.
While the maturity date was not discussed specifically, all loans in the past had
typically lasted less than a year. See R 305-14 (the Promissory Notes made to
Eagle Ridge). It is important to note that, when reviewing a contract to see if its
terms are sufficiently definite "none of [the terms] individually are determinative."
Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 367 (2005).
In this case, the Frantzes and IIB had nearly every aspect of the loan worked
out because they had been doing business together for so long and had used the
same language over and over and over again. In their agreement, there were to be
no deviations from the norm. The only things that were to change was the amount
(which was to be determined as a specific percentage of the "as completed" value
of the collateral) and the duration, which would be for a year or less (at which
point the loan and Project would be reevaluated). As a result, the promise which
IIB made was certain, definite and capable of being enforceable.
More importantly, to keep this appeal in perspective, all the Frantzes must
proffer is a genuine dispute of fact to withstand summary judgment (with all
inferences being drawn in the Frantzes' favor). In this case, there is ample
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parties'

history and course

substantiate

that the Bank's agreement was to "continue" to do what it had always done: fund
the Project to completion with all terms to remain the same except the due date and
the amount.
IIB promised to continue to lend with all the same terms that had always
been in the loans issued since the Project began. The only terms that were to
change were the amount and the due date. All else was to be as it always was. See
R 412, ,28 ("Under [IIB's promise] IIB agreed to lend the construction funds ..
. under the same loan terms as the then existing loan between IIB and Eagle
Ridge ... " (emphasis added)); see also R 139-40 ("IIB represented to Frantz's that
IIB had already underwritten the final round of funding for the project and had
found the Frantz's to be creditworthy for a three year extension ... on the same or
similar terms of the prior construction loans to Eagle Ridge." (emphasis
added)); see also R. 137 ("IIB represented to Frantz's that IIB would continue to
fund development loans ... " (emphasis added)).
Using the term "continue to fund" at the very least infers that all terms
would be the same except for those expressly and routinely altered. MerriamWebster dictionary defines "continue" as: "to maintain without interruption a
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" Merriam-Webster

<

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/co https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/continuentinue> (accessed Jan. 19, 2017). The Frantzes
wanted to maintain the loans which had been issued, which loans all had identical
terms except for the maturity date, the amount, the borrower9, and the interest rate
(which rate was based on the Prime lending rate, an easily ascertainable figure).
With the above mentioned references, in connection with the extensive
history of prior dealings (which included loan terms identical to one another) the
Frantzes have provided at least a genuine dispute of facts of whether or not there
was a promise/agreement- with terms definite enough to be enforced- in existence.
As such, the district court's entry of summary judgment should be overturned.

D. The Record is Replete with Support for the Proposition that IIB
Entered into an Oral Agreement with the Frantzes.
IIB, in its brief, claims that the record does not support the Frantzes'
contention that IIB entered into an oral agreement with them as individuals. See

9 IIB

did not care who the borrower was, so long as the borrower was the owner of
the Project. IIB never asked for any financials of the borrower; instead, IIB always
looked to the financial strength of the guarantors, the Frantzes. As such, IIB was
not concerned about the identity of the borrower.
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IIB errs
testimony. In support ofIIB's contention, it points to two locations in the record:
R, p. 134 (the Frantzes' Amended Answer). R, p. 425 (the Frantzes' reply to IIB's

objection to mediating this matter). Neither example supports IIB 's theory because
neither reference claims that IIB's representations were exclusively made to Eagle
Ridge. IIB tries to add language into the record which simply is not present.
Frantzes' Statement

IIB is barred from pursuing this suit
against the Frantzes because IIB's
claims are the proximate result of IIB 's
action "in breaching its contract with
Eagle Ridge to provide funding to
complete the Eagle Ridge project. .. "

"All of the interactions between Marty
Frantz and IIB were in behalf of Eagle
Ridge on Twin Lakes."

IIB's Interpretation of Frantzes'
Statement
IIB is barred from pursuing this suit
against the Frantzes because IIB's
claims are the proximate result ofIIB's
action "in breaching its contract which
was made exclusively with Eagle Ridge
to provide funding to complete the
Eagle Ridge project. .. " (emphasized
language added).

"All of the interactions between Marty
Frantz and IIB were exclusively made
in behalf of Eagle Ridge on Twin
Lakes" (emphasized language added).

The first instance upon which IIB relied does not indicate that the oral contract IIB
made with Eagle Ridge was made exclusively with Eagle Ridge. Yet, IIB pretends
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it

sense

whatsoever.
The second instance is not sworn testimony, nor is it made by any party to
any related litigation. More importantly, however, it does not indicate that Mr.
Frantz acted exclusively on behalf of Eagle Ridge; only that when he did act, it was
at least on behalf of Eagle Ridge. 10 In short, IIB attempts to improperly use the
maxim, expression unius est exclusion alterius (the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another). See St. Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs.,

LLP, 148 Idaho 479,487 (2009). Not only is application of that maxim not
mandatory, but it "is only a tool used to determine legislative intent. It is not an
unimpeachable rule of law." Id.; Hewson v. Asker's Thrift Shop, 120 Idaho 164,
166-67 (1991). Additionally, in St. Alphonsus, this Court also looked at the
context of the matter to determine ifthere was a reason to apply the maxim. Id. at
487.
The context of the Frantzes' Answer and Counterclaim overwhelmingly
supports the position that the Frantzes consider IIB's oral promise to have been

10

It is important to note that the case in which that document was filed was not
even this case. Further, it was not prepared or sworn to by either of the Frantzes.
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both the Frantzes and Eagle Ridge. There are eighteen

in the

Frantzes Answer and Counterclaim which reference the fact that IIB orally made a
promise to the Frantzes! See Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 12-17. Not one of
those references, however, claims that IIB's promise was made exclusively to the
Frantzes. None of them exclude the possibility that it was also made to Eagle
Ridge. As IIB pointed out, in that same document, the Frantzes also assert that IIB
breached its promise to Eagle Ridge.
So, one could be left with the impression that: 1) the Frantzes testimony is
inconsistent (which requires the reader to assume that expression unius est
exclusion alterius), or 2) that the Frantzes have always and all-along contended
that the IIB's representations were to both the Frantzes personally (as guarantors)
and to Eagle Ridge (the borrower, for whom Mr. Frantz was President). The latter
option allows the Frantzes' statements to be read for face value without producing
an absurd result (it being absurd for the Frantzes, under the advice of counsel who
drafted those documents, to have made several inconsistent statements, some of
which are in the same document).
Even then, it should be remembered that all the Frantzes need to do to
survive the summary judgment motion is to produce something more than a
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scintilla

evidence that there are

dispute which

a genume issue.

Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005). The

Frantzes have more than eighteen times across five different occasions 11 in sworn
testimony stated that IIB made promises to them, personally. See Appellant's
Opening Brief, pp. 12-24.
As a result, there is more than just a scintilla of evidence that the Frantzes
have alleged and provided repeated testimony that IIB's promisees at least
included the Frantzes, if not others. Resultantly, the district court's grant of
summary judgment on the basis that the Frantzes were not privy to the Bank's
agreement/promise should be reversed.

E. The Frantzes have not Waived their right to Assert their Affirmative
Defenses
While it is true that the Frantzes' personal guarantees are chock-full of
waivers, Idaho law requires a waiver to be clear and unequivocal. Knipe Land Co.,
151 Idaho 449,458 (2011) ("a waiver will not be inferred except from a clear and

11

1) The Frantzes' Verified Answer and Counterclaim, 2) Mr. Frantz's personal
deposition, 3) Mr. Frantz's declaration, 4) Mr. Frantz's Declaration in Oppossition
to IIB's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 5) the Frantzes' responses to IIB's
Interrogatories.
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an

to

the

actually indicate that the Frantzes waive their right to assert the affirmative
defenses they have alleged. IIB cites various provisions in the guarantees:

Contract Provision
CONTINUING GUARANTEE OF
PAYMENT AND
PERFORMANCE.
For good and valuable consideration,
Guarantor absolutely and
unconditionally guarantees full and
punctual payment and satisfaction of
the Indebtedness of Borrower to
Lender, and the performance and
discharge of all Borrower's
obligations under the Note and the
Related Documents. This is a
guaranty of payment and
performance and not of collection,
so Lender can enforce this Guaranty
against Guarantor even when Lender
has not exhausted Lender's remedies
against anyone else obligated to pay
the Indebtedness or against any
collateral securing the Indebtedness,
this Guaranty or any other guaranty
12

Waiver Analysis
Nowhere in this provision do
the Frantzes clearly and
unequivocally waive their
right to file affirmative
defenses against the Bank.
It's true, it states that the
Frantzes will make payment
"without set-off 12 or deduction
13 or counterclaim," however,
the Frantzes affirmative
defenses do not include a setoff, deduction or counterclaim.
The Frantzes affirmative
defenses would, upon being
proven, bar IIB from entirely
from pursuing their claim.
That is not an amount. As
such, it is not a set-off or a
deduction because the
Frantzes' affirmative defenses
do not seek to setoffIIB's loan
by an amount owed to the

"Set-off' is defined as, "A debtor's right to reduce the amount of a debt by any
sum the creditor owes the debtor." "Setoff' Black's Law Dictionary 1581 (10th Ed.
2014 )( delux ).
13 "Deduction" is defined as, "The act or process of subtracting or taking away."
Id. at p. 501.
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of the Indebtedness. Guarantor will
make any payments to Lender or its
order, on demand, in legal tender of
the United States, in same-day
funds, without set-off or deduction
I or coumerc1aim ...
,

1

•

If Lender presently holds one or
more guaranties, or hereafter
receives additional guaranties from
Guarantor, Lender's rights under all
guaranties shall be cumulative ...
This provision does not
discuss waivers at all. If its
purported intent is for the
Frantzes to waive any and all
Guarantor represents and warrants to affirmative defenses, it does
Lender that (A) no representations or not do so clearly or
unequivocally as there is no
agreements of any kind have been
made to Guarantor which would limit mention of any affirmative
or qualify in any way the terms of this defenses.
Guaranty ...
GUARANTOR'S
REPRESENTATIONS AND
WARRANTIES.

GUARANTOR'S WAIVERS.

Except as prohibited by applicable
law, Guarantor waives any right to
require Lender (A) to continue
lending money or to extend other
credit to Borrower; ... ( C) to resort
for payment or to proceed directly or
at once against any person, including
Borrower or any other guarantor; (D)
to roceed direct! a ainst or exhaust

Appellant's Reply Brief- Pg. 18

As to the first paragraph, there
is no applicable waiver found.
As to the second paragraph,
the Frantzes affirmative
defenses are not based on
suretyship or impairment of
collateral. As such, this
paragraph does not stand for
the Frantzes' waiver of their
affirmative defenses.

I any collateral held by Lender from
Borrower, any other guarantor, or
any other person ...
Guarantor also waives any and all
rights or defenses based on
suretyship or impairment of
collateral, including, but not limited
to, any rights or defenses arising by
reason of (A) ... , (B) ... , (C) any
disability or other defense of
Borrower, of any other guarantor, or
of any other person, or by reason of
the cessation of Borrower's liability
from any cause whatsoever, other
than payment in full in legal tender,
of the indebtedness ...

I

Likewise, the third paragraph
waives only claims for "setoff,
counterclaim, counter demand,
[or] recoupment 14 ." This, like
the other prov1s1ons, does not
address the Frantzes ability to
file and prosecute their
affirmative defenses. As
discussed above, the Frantzes
do not seek to set-off or
counterclaim through their
affirmative defenses.

Guarantor further waives and agrees
not to assert or claim at any time any
deductions to the amount guaranteed
under this Guaranty for any claim of
setoff, counterclaim, counter
demand, recoupment or similar right,
whether such claim, demand or right
may be asserted by the Borrower, the
Guarantor, or both.

14

"Recoupment" is defined as being synonymous with "Settoff." "Recoupment"
Black's Law Dictionary 1466 (10th Ed. 2014)(delux). Black's also states, "In
modern practice, the recoupment has been replaced by the compulsory
counterclaim." Id.
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GUARANTOR'S
UNDERSTANDING WITH
RESPECT TO WAIVERS.
Guarantor warrants and agrees that
each of the waivers set forth above is
made with Guarantor's full
knowledge of its significance and
consequences and that, under the
circumstances, the waivers are
reasonable and not contrary to public
policy or law.

provision simply
irrelevant because, as pointed
out above, the Frantzes did not
waive their right to assert their
affirmative defenses.

R pp. 315-44. As can be seen from above, there are no clear or unequivocal
waivers of the Frantzes' affirmative defenses. The Frantzes have not asserted an
affirmative defense of set-off, a deduction, a counterclaim, nor an affirmative
defense based on suretyship law. As such, they have not waived their ability to
bring the affirmative defenses listed in their First Amended Answer. R 133-34.
Resultantly, the district court's judgment ( or any amendment thereof) cannot be
affirmed on the basis of waiver.

F. The Guarantees do not Preclude Consideration of the Bank's Oral
Promise/Agreement
While it is true that the Frantzes did waive the right to require IIB ''to
continue lending money or to extend other credit to Borrower," that waiver is
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to credit issued "to Borrower."

"' 1
pp . .J~

lS

defined term in the guarantees. R 317. In the Guarantees, "Borrower" is
exclusively limited to Eagle Ridge, the corporation. However, the Frantzes have
not alleged that IIB would issue a loan to Eagle Ridge. Instead, the Frantzes have
asserted that IIB would continue to fund the development of the Project, not the
corporation, Eagle Ridge. The following sworn assertions by the Frantzes
illustrate this:
From the inception of the Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes project, IIB
represented to the Frantz's, that so long as they were creditworthy,
IIB would fund development loans for Eagle Ridge at Twin Lakes
[which is the name of the Project, there is no "Inc." designation] ...
through completion of the project."
R 136 (sworn testimony in the Frantzes' Amended Verified Answer)
(emphasis added).

One strategy proposed by Frantz's, was to restructure the project, have
Frantz inject new capital, and purchase additional land thereby
improving the loan to ratio of the loan allowing for increasing
construction funding of the development as IIB had done in the
past and represented to the Frantz's it would do in the future.

Id. (emphasis added).
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IIB represented to
Frantz's that IIB would continue to fund
development loans but would only be able to do so at a ratio of sixty
(60%) loan to value because of the economic downturn.
R 137 (emphasis added). This does not indicate that the loans were to be issued to
the Eagle Ridge corporation.
In reliance upon IIB's promise to provide financing as described
above to complete the Eagle Ridge project, Frantz's personally
invested substantial amounts of capital into the project during the end
of 2008, 2009, and 2010 and reconfigured the Eagle Ridge project.

Id. (emphasis added). Again, there is no reference of the loan being issued
to the Eagle Ridge corporation; only funding to complete the Project.

However, IIB refused to honor its commitment to fund the
completion of the project and instead changed its position and
refused to fund completion of the project.

Id. (emphasis added). There is still no mention of extending a loan to the
Eagle Ridge corporation. The entire focus was on finishing the Project.
IIB is equitably estopped to deny the contract and to perform the
contract as agreed between the parties by providing funding for
completion of the Eagle Ridge project ...
R 140 (emphasis added). Combined with the fact that the Frantzes planned on
providing 50 acres as additional collateral (which acreage was not a part of the
original 104 acres mortgaged by the Bank and which acreage was owned by a
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separate entity, other than Eagle Ridge 1

it was more than probable that the

would be made to a different entity, an entity that was not the Eagle Ridge
corporation. As long as the Borrower was owned/controlled by the Frantzes and
the Frantzes were personal guarantors, the Bank did not care who the Borrower
was.
Consequently, since IIB 's promise was not that it would continue to lend
money to Eagle Ridge (the corporation), but instead that it would extend loans to
finish the Project, the Bank's promise was not waived by the Frantzes when they
agreed that they would not require IIB to continue to lend money to Eagle Ridge
(the corporation). After all, the only right waived was the Frantzes' right to require

IIB to lend to the Eagle Ridge corporation. IIB's own guarantees (which it
unilaterally wrote) only restricted the Frantzes from requiring IIB to lend to the
Eagle Ridge corporation. However, the Frantzes are not, in their affirmative
defenses, claiming that IIB should have loaned money to the Eagle Ridge
corporation. Since the beginning, the Frantzes have maintained that IIB was
required to loan money so that the (Eagle Ridge) Project could be completed. The

15

R 431-34 (The Frantzes response to IIB's interrogatory which outlines that the
50 acres were never owned by Eagle Ridge, but by other entities).
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transactions would have

certainly been a different

entity since the Eagle Ridge corporation did not own the additional 50 acre
collateral that was going to be hypothecated to the Bank. R. 431-34. Furthermore,
the past history of the Project demonstrates that there were multiple entities acting
as "Borrower," which entities were switched out for various reasons. Since Eagle
Ridge did not own the 50 acres it could not have pledged it as an asset. The
Frantzes requiring IIB to continue to loan money to finish the Project does not
violate the Frantzes' waiver, because the Frantzes merely waived their right to
require IJB to loan money to the Eagle Ridge corporation.
Likewise, the Frantzes' acknowledgment that "no representations or
agreements of any kind have been made to Guarantor which would limit or qualify
in any way the terms of this Guaranty" does not bar the Frantzes' affirmative
defenses either. At no point have the Frantzes alleged that the Bank's oral
agreement/promise limited or qualified the guarantees. There are no allegations
that the Bank promised that it would not collect on the guarantees. There are no
allegations that IIB promised it would first go after the collateral. There are no
allegations that IIB could only act on the guarantees

if it provided the funding. In

fact, the oral promise/agreement from the Bank did not address the guarantees at
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except

the extent that it acknowledged that the Frantzes

to

guaranty any loan provided for the purpose of finishing the Project.
In and of itself, the Bank's oral promise/agreement does not alter, amend,
limit, or qualify in any way the guarantees. As such, the oral promise does not
violate the Frantzes' representation of such. Consequently, it cannot be found that
the Frantzes guarantees preclude them from raising IIB 's oral promise/agreement
in their affirmative defenses.

G. Conclusion
The district court erred when it found dismissed, by summary judgment, all
of the Frantzes' affirmative defenses on account of its finding that the Frantzes
lacked privity. Furthermore, the district court's Amended Judgment cannot be
upheld on the alternate theories proposed by the Bank. Therefore, this Court
should reverse the orders of the district court and deny Hawley Troxell's motion
for summary judgment and remand this matter back for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted on this 20th day of January, 2017.
POST FALLA LAW, LLC

Jonathon Frantz,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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I hereby certify that on the 20th day of January, 2017 I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be delivered to Ms. Schwagger via first class mail at: PO
Box 1617, Boise, ID 83701-1617.
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